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  The more things change, the more they remain the same.  Or so it seems with 
Japanese corporate governance.  Over the past decade, the formal institutional 
environment for Japanese corporate governance has been reformed significantly and at an 
accelerated pace.  In response, some important new trends in corporate practice may be 
developing.  Yet despite substantial legal reform and a decade after Japan’s economic 
problems emerged, there has been no sea change in Japanese corporate governance 
practices.  To adopt a metaphor favored in new institutional economics literature, the 
rules of the game have changed; whether the play of the game will change, however, is 
still an open question.   
In this chapter, I seek to answer three questions about institutional transformation 
in the context of Japanese corporate governance: What’s changed, what hasn’t changed, 
                                                 
*  Fuyo Professor of Law and Director, Center for Japanese Legal Studies, Columbia Law School.  I 
received helpful comments from Bruce Aronson, Mark West, Anthony Zaloom, volume editors Magnus 
Blomstrom and Sumner La Croix, and participants at the Institutional Change conference in Honololu, 
particularly David Johnson.  Conversations with Hideki Kanda at an early stage of the project were also 
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  2and why?  Answers to these questions should provide at least some tentative insights into 
the central issue—has it been a “lost decade” for Japanese corporate governance reform? 
The chapter is structured as follows:  Part I briefly surveys the major trends in 
corporate law reform over the past decade, emphasizing the magnitude and pace of 
formal institutional change in this area.  Part II examines corporate practices that have 
changed in response to the new institutional environment, and conversely, key areas of 
stickiness in Japanese corporate practices.  Part III attempts to provide an explanation for 
this pattern of change and non-change.   
Revealing the conclusion at the outset, it has not been a lost decade for Japanese 
corporate governance reform.  Indeed, the formal institutional environment for corporate 
governance today is significantly more flexible and conducive to shareholder wealth 
maximization
1 than it was in the early 1990s.  And there are important, if tentative, signs 
that the new environment is actually facilitating new forms of corporate finance, 
alternative organizational structures and more diverse business practices.  But the new 
institutional package is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for fundamental corporate 
governance reform.  Dynamics external to the formal corporate governance system 
narrowly defined—such as capital market developments and new trends in the dispersion 
and identity of shareholders--must animate the new institutional arrangement.  Even 
“perfect” corporate law has limits (Roe 2003): it can help facilitate, but not guarantee, 
good corporate governance.  After a decade of legal reform, Japan now has pretty good 
                                                 
1 My view is that shareholder wealth maximization should be the principal goal of corporate law and 
governance, not because it is the only valid goal, but because pursuit of this objective helps ensure that 
management adds value to the enterprise, and provides a fairly transparent baseline against which to 
measure managerial performance.  I acknowledge that the point is debatable.   See Allen and Gale (2002) 
for a theoretical model showing that under some circumstances, Japan-style “stakeholder” capitalism can 
do better than Anglo-Saxon shareholder capitalism. 
  3corporate law.
2  The question for the coming decade is whether actors will utilize that law 
as a framework on which to build a new set of good corporate governance practices. 
I.  A Sea Change Decade for Japanese Corporate Law 
The past ten years can fairly be called a “sea change decade” for Japanese 
corporate law.  For reasons that will be explored in detail below, the decade witnessed the 
most sweeping and fast-paced amendments to the corporate law (found principally in the 
Commercial Code) since its enactment a century ago (see e.g. Kanda 2000).  Table 1 lists 
the major amendments to the Code and related laws over the past ten years. 
 
 
Table 1: Major Commercial Code Amendments 1993-2002 
 
Fixing fee of 8200 yen for shareholder derivative suits 
 
Introducing a board of statutory auditors [kansayaku] 
 
1993 
Reducing shareholding threshold to demand inspection of records 
 
1994  Deregulating limitations on repurchase of shares (1) 
 




Simplifying merger procedures 
 
1998  Deregulating limitations on repurchase of shares (3) 
 
1999  Creating share exchange system 
 
2000  Creating company spin off system 
 
2001  Lifting ban on treasury stock 
 
                                                 
2  Only “pretty good” because the Commercial Code retains some arcane requirements like stated capital, 
and paternalistic features, such as super-majority voting to approve mergers, which are protective of 
shareholders in a rather mechanical and inflexible way. 
  4Creating new stock acquisition right [shin kabu yoyaku ken] system 
 
Expanding the authority of statutory auditors 
 
Authorizing limitations on managers’ liability 
 
2002  Creating an option to form committees of the board of directors in lieu of 





These amendments can be placed into two groups.  One group might be called 
flexibility enhancing amendments.  These Code changes expand corporate finance options 
and increase organizational flexibility for Japanese firms in the areas of mergers, 
divestitures, and reorganizations.  A second group might be called monitoring enhancing 
amendments.  These Code amendments include changes to the shareholder derivative suit 
mechanism
3 and statutory auditor system as well as reforms to the corporate board 
structure.  A brief survey of these two groups of amendments follows. 
Flexibility Enhancing Amendments.  
Stock Options.  Beginning in 1997, the Commercial Code formally 
authorized the issuance of stock options to certain firm employees (though more 
thorough liberalization required several additional amendments in ensuing years).
4  
Liberalization of the stock option regime provides flexibility in employee 
compensation schemes.  It also contributes to the enhancement of monitoring, by 
helping to align the incentives of managers and shareholders.  According to a 
Nikko Securities/Towers Perrin survey, the number of listed companies issuing 
                                                 
3 A derivative suit is brought by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action.  The action seeks 
recovery, on behalf of the corporation, for damages caused by a director’s breach of duty. 
4  Commcercial Code, Art. 280-19. 
  5stock options climbed to 463 in 2001, up from zero in 1997 and representative of 
about one-sixth of all listed companies (Daily Yomiuri 2001).   
Mergers.  Also in 1997, merger procedures were liberalized, eliminating 
individual creditor notifications and permitting short-form mergers, whereby 
shareholder approval is not required if the parent already owns most of the target 
company’s stock.
5
Share-for-Share Exchanges and Holding Companies.  The Commercial 
Code was revised in 1999 to introduce share-for-share exchanges.
6   This was a 
response to the abolition, in 1997, of the Anti-Monopoly Law’s ban on holding 
companies.  Share exchanges can be used to create wholly owned subsidiaries in a 
holding company structure, and to enable companies to use their shares as 
acquisition currency to take a partially owned subsidiary private or to acquire an 
unrelated company.  Capital gains taxes are not owed at the time of the share 
exchange.  Time-consuming and expensive valuation procedures to protect 
creditors mandated by the Commercial Code for ordinary mergers are not required.  
Minority shareholders can be forcibly excluded from the subsidiary (although they 
become shareholders of the parent).   
Eliminating the prohibition on holding companies could have several 
important benefits for Japanese firms (see Aoki 2000: 133-140).  Most basically, it 
will promote spin-offs, mergers, and corporate reorganizations.  But it will also 
provide useful legal separation between strategic and operating units of the firm, 
and allow firms to differentiate personnel management systems.  Firms may retain 
                                                 
5  Law No. 71, June 6, 1997. 
6 Commercial Code, Art. 352 et seq. 
  6conventional  “Japanese” employment patterns where useful, while introducing 
more diverse arrangements in other subsidiaries.  For financial institutions, removal 
of the ban on financial holding companies facilitates reorganization of the financial 
industry into functionally diverse groups offering banking, securities, and 
insurance products and services.   
Spin-offs and Split-offs.  In 2000, a new statutory scheme provided a 
flexible framework for separating business units from parent companies.
7  Prior to 
the amendment, divestitures were extremely cumbersome, because corporate 
transfers of liabilities and assets required individual approval of creditors and 
court-supervised valuations, respectively. 
Corporate finance.  A variety of amendments and special statutes over the 
past decade have effectively eliminated the prohibition against redemption of a 
company’s outstanding shares and expanded the forms of equity securities (such as 
tracking stock and other classified shares) that a firm is permitted to issue.
8  Share 
buy backs can be used to distribute cash to shareholders and are useful in a variety 
of corporate recapitalization schemes; the liberalization of equity securities 
provides greater flexibility in corporate finance techniques. 
Corporate Reorganizations. A Civil Rehabilitation Act, enacted in 2000 
and modeled loosely on the U.S. Chapter 11 regime, provides more flexible and 
efficient reorganization procedures than its predecessor statute.  In a major 
departure from past reorganization procedures in Japan, the Civil Rehabilitation 
Act is a debtor-in-possession system (meaning that existing management, rather 
                                                 
7 Commercial Code Art. 373 et seq. 
8  Commercial Code, Art. 210 et seq. (acquisition of company’s shares); Art. 222 (classes of shares). 
  7than a court-appointed trustee, operates the firm during the rehabilitation process 
and devises a rehabilitation plan).  Passage of the rehabilitation plan only requires 
approval by a majority of qualifying creditors.  It is now possible to do a “pre-
packaged” bankruptcy, with the reorganized firm emerging under new ownership.
9
Monitoring Enhancing Amendments. 
Shareholder Derivative Suits.  Until 1993, most Japanese courts required 
plaintiffs in shareholder derivative suits to pay a filing fee on a sliding scale based 
on the amount of damages sought.  Under this scale, in dollar terms a $10 million 
claim against management, for example, would require a filing fee of $25,000—a 
fee that was forfeited if the plaintiffs lost (West 2001a).  The 1993 amendment 
fixed the filing fee at the nominal sum of 8200 yen (about $70), eliminating a 
major barrier to this form of shareholder monitoring.  In the same set of 
amendments, the required minimum shareholding to inspect corporate books and 
records was reduced from 10 percent to 3 percent.  Practically, however, this 
threshold is still too high to be meaningful for purposes of bringing suit against 
management or the exercise of other shareholders’ rights, since most shareholders 
at the 3 percent level are friendly, stable shareholders.
10
Reforms to Statutory Auditory System.  Japanese corporate law has a 
German-inspired institution known as the statutory auditor [kansayaku], whose 
basic function is to monitor the board’s compliance with law and the certificate of 
                                                 
9 In a prepackaged bankruptcy, the creditors agree upon the essential terms of the restructuring plan 
before the bankruptcy filing.  This is designed to reduce the length and complexity of the proceedings, and 
to minimize judicial intervention.  Prepackaged bankruptcies were pioneered in the United States. 
10  Compare, for example, Delaware corporate law, under which any shareholder may inspect corporate 
books and records for any proper purpose.  Del. General Corporation Law, Section 220. 
  8incorporation.  Over the past decade, several reforms were made to this corporate 
organ.  Amendments in 1993 mandated that large companies have at least three 
auditors, functioning as a board of audit.
11  In 2001, amendments sought to 
strengthen the auditor regime by extending the term of office and responsibilities of 
auditors, while increasing the required number and qualifications of outside 
auditors.
12  Effective in 2005, at least half of the board of audit must be comprised 
of outside auditors. 
Board reforms. A major overhaul of the Commercial Code in 2002 allows 
firms to opt out of the statutory auditor system in favor of a U.S. style “committee 
system” for corporate governance.
13  In lieu of statutory auditors, firms can 
establish board committees for the audit, nomination and compensation functions.  
A majority of the members of each committee must be independent.  A 2001 
amendment creates a formal distinction between directors, bearing oversight 
responsibility but not day-to-day managerial functions, and executive officers who 
actually run the firm.
14  These reforms are designed to strengthen the supervisory 
role of the board and to enhance the separation of monitoring and decision making 
functions.  
                                                 
11  Law for Special Exceptions to Commercial Code Concerning Audit, Etc. (Special Exception Law), 
Arts. 18, 18-2. 
12 E.g. Special Exception Law, Art. 18(at least half of auditors must be independent); Commercial Code 
Art. 260-3(1) (requiring auditors to attend meetings of the board); Art. 273 (four year term). 
13  Special Exception Law, Arts.  21-5 et seq. 
14 Special Exception Law, Arts. 21-5, 21-15.  Previously, there was no legal distinction between directors 
and officers, although beginning in the late 1990s companies had begun to informally make the distinction 
by creating an executive officer [shikko yakuin] position for executives who did not simultaneously serve 
on the board. 
  9 Accounting Reforms.  Japanese accounting standards have been revised 
significantly in the past several years to bring them substantially into conformity with 
international accounting standards.  Cash flow statements were introduced in fiscal year 
1999, and rules on consolidated accounting were tightened in that year.  Mark-to-market 
accounting for financial assets was introduced in fiscal year 2001.  As of fiscal year 2001, 
pension liabilities must be reflected on balance sheets.  The new rules enhance 
management transparency and provide powerful new incentives for restructuring or 
divesting under-performing assets, which no longer can be concealed by moving them 
into affiliated corporations.   
 
II.  An Ambiguous Decade for Corporate Practices 
 
Has this plethora of new formal rules for corporate finance, organization and 
governance changed the way Japanese firms are structured and managed?  To date, the 
evidence on corporate governance change in Japan is ambiguous.  While some data 
suggest meaningful responses to the new rule environment have occurred in several areas, 
there is little sign that Japanese corporate governance practices are being fundamentally 
transformed or are rapidly “converging” with those of the United States.   
Although my primary aim here is simply to catalogue the areas of change and 
non-change, I hasten to emphasize the controversial nature of any measurement exercise 
in this field.  Whether Japanese corporate law and governance practices need to be 
fundamentally reformed, and particularly whether they need to emulate U.S. corporate 
practices, remain controversial issues (on the first issue see, e.g. Miwa and Ramseyer 
2003; on the second, see e.g. Osugi and Zaloom 2002).  At the same time, however, some 
sort of baseline is needed against which to measure and evaluate reform.  I use the U.S. 
  10corporate governance system for purposes of comparison, both because it is the principal 
competing model of corporate governance, and because the primary normative features 
(not always achieved, to be sure) of that model—transparency, managerial accountability, 
and adaptability--appear to have become de facto “global standards” in corporate 
governance.   
A.  What’s Changed 
Signs of change can be found principally in the areas of shareholder activism, 
corporate mergers and other organizational changes, board structure, and corporate 
finance.  Reinforcing and reflecting these changes are subtle shifts in “norms” about 
corporate governance in Japan.   
Shareholder activism.  The seemingly technical change in procedural law in 1993 
that lowered the cost of filing derivative suits led to a major increase in this form of 
shareholder monitoring.  Japanese shareholders brought a total of about twenty derivative 
suits between 1950 and 1990.  By contrast, at least 494 derivative suits were filed 
between 1991 and 2000 (Milhaupt 2003).  While the Japanese derivative suit mechanism 
suffers from the same attorney’s-fee-based incentive distortions that plague such suits in 
the United States (West 2001a), this shift toward heightened shareholder monitoring may 
deter at least blatant forms of wrongdoing by managers, and places greater pressure on 
management to avoid actions that are per se destructive of shareholder value, such as 
refusing to sell portfolio shares held in a stable shareholding relationship to the highest 
bidder.   Moreover, institutional investors, whose managers must answer to their own 
shareholders and beneficiaries, will likely face increased pressure to focus on financial 
returns from their portfolio investments.  Recently issued Pension Fund Association 
  11Guidelines reinforce this trend.  The Guidelines state that fund managers should evaluate 
disclosure, dividend policies and corporate governance in exercising shareholders’ rights, 
and provide that fund managers should be evaluated on the exercise of shareholders’ 
rights in addition to financial performance. 
  Greater resort to derivative litigation has also created new law clarifying the legal 
responsibilities of directors to their firms.  The best example of this process is the Daiwa 
Bank litigation.  In that case, shareholders of Daiwa Bank derivatively sued eleven 
current and former directors for failing to uncover and report to U.S. authorities massive 
unauthorized trading in the Bank’s New York branch that ultimately resulted in almost 
$1.5 billion in losses and fines.  The directors, heeding a Ministry of Finance indication 
that disclosure of the losses to the Federal Reserve would be untimely given instability in 
the financial system, filed a misleading Call Report with the U.S. banking regulators, a 
violation of U.S. law.  The Osaka District Court found the directors liable for breach of 
duty, and ordered them to pay about $775 million in damages.  The court shrugged off 
the directors’ argument that the Ministry of Finance’s conduct should insulate the 
directors from liability.  The court found that the “defendant [directors] had persisted in 
following local rules that only apply in Japan, despite the fact that [the firm’s operations] 
had expanded on a global scale.
15  Through this and other decisions in derivative suits, 
the courts help to educate management about proper behavior with respect to their 
shareholders. 
  Although still extremely small in number, the past few years have also witnessed 
unprecedented (at least by Japanese standards) incidents of hostile M&A activity.  For 
                                                 
15 Nishimura v. Abekawa (The Daiwa Bank Case), 199 Shiryoban shoji homu 248, 255 (D. Ct. Sept. 20, 
2000). 
  12example, in 2000, a domestic takeover firm, M&A Consulting, launched a hostile bid for 
Shoei Corporation, one of the first postwar hostile bids for a Japanese corporation by a 
Japanese corporation.  M&A Consulting followed this in 2002 with a proxy fight over 
dividend policies at a firm called Tokyo Style.  Both attempts failed (more on this in the 
next section).  However, when considered in combination with several successful, 
unsolicited bids by foreign firms such as Cable & Wireless’s acquisition of IDC and 
Boehringer Ingelheim’s acquisition of a blocking stake (more than 33.3% of the shares) 
in SS Pharmeceuticals, it is fair to say that Japanese management is no longer fully secure 
from the threat of hostile acquisition or other unwelcome shareholder advances.   
Separately, a nonprofit corporate reform organization known as Shareholder 
[Kabunushi] Ombudsman has also contributed to a more activist shareholder environment 
in recent years (see Milhaupt 2003).  This organization has been involved in virtually all 
of the high profile shareholder derivative litigation in Japan, and has reached large 
monetary settlements with management and commitments to institute procedures to 
prevent future wrongdoing at their firms.  Although not a highly visible player in the 
Japanese corporate governance scene, Japanese managers ignore this activist organization 
at their peril. 
  13Mergers and organizational changes.  Friendly merger and acquisition activity in 
Japan has increased significantly in recent years.
16  Although still small in comparison to 
deal activity in the United States, the increase in the number and size of transactions in 
recent years is striking.  
Available measures show marked increases in the 1990s, as shown in Figure 1.
17  
Data from Recof (2001, 2002), which showed approximately 300 mergers and 
acquisitions of Japanese firms in 1991, reports 847 transactions in 1999, 1,241 in 2000, 











1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Figure 1.  Number of Deals Involving Japanese Targets, 1993-
2000
Recof Data Thomson Data
 
Thomson Financial data show a significant increase in purely domestic (“in-in”) 
M&A.  After averaging fewer than 100 transactions per year during 1990-1994, with a 
gross average value of about ¥800 billion ($8 billion), in-in M&A reached over 1,300 
transactions in 1999, with a gross transaction value of ¥13 trillion ($130 billion).  The 
number of “out-in” transactions, which averaged only about fifty per year during 1990-
                                                 
16 For more detail, see Milhaupt and West (2003). 
17 Sources:  Thomson Financial, Merger Yearbook (various years); Recof (2001, 2002). 
  141994, with a total average value of only ¥50 billion ($500 million), increased to 227 
transactions with a value of ¥3 trillion ($30 billion) in 1999.  Even in the first quarter of 
2003, after a steep decline in worldwide M&A activity, Japan ranked fifth in M&A 
volume by deal value, with 444 deals valued at almost $20 billion, up from 396 deals  
valued at $17.4 billion in first quarter of 2002 (Mergers Shapshot 2003). 
The increase in the Japanese M&A market can also be seen relative to gross 
domestic product.  In 1990, Japanese merger activity was approximately 0.4 percent of 
GDP.  By 1999, Japanese merger activity was approximately 3.3 percent of GDP.  In the 
ranking of targets by nation, Japan moved from a 0.6 percent market share in 1997 to a 
fifth-place 4.5 percent market share in 1999 (Thomson Financial, Merger Yearbook), and 
to 5.5 percent in the first quarter of 2002 (Thomson Financial 2002). 
There are no data available on the specific legal mechanics of each deal.  But 
some mergers, such as the giant Mizuho Financial Group alliance that combined Dai-Ichi 
Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank, and the Industrial Bank of Japan, have used the new holding 
company structure.  The newly established share exchange system also appears popular; 
one source lists seventeen such transactions in 1999 and another twenty five in the first 
six months of 2000, involving such firms as Sony, Matsushita, Isuzu, and Toyota 
(Kikuchi 2000: 118-119).   In the first fiscal year that spin-offs were legal, more than 200 
such transactions occurred (Kaisha Bunkatsu 2002), including several combinations that 
would have not been undertaken absent the change (Kaisha ha koshite henshin saseru 
2002). 
Board and officer reforms.  In an effort to enhance the effectiveness of the board, 
in the mid-1990s many companies began to consider reducing the size of the board and 
  15including outside directors.  Survey data show an increase in firms displaying particular 
interest in reducing the number of directors from 28.6 percent to 46.2 percent from 1998 
to 2000 (Tokyo Shoken Torihikijo 2000).  Of the firms reducing their boards, 79.9 
percent scaled back to fewer than 10 directors.  By May 2001, 38.8 percent of first-
section Tokyo Stock Exchange firms had added outside directors to their boards (Shagai 
Torishimariyaku 38% ga Sennin 2001).  Moreover, diversity of business backgrounds 
among board members is beginning to draw attention as a desirable distinguishing 
characteristic for Japanese firms (Diversity Distinguishes IY Bank 2001).   
In concert with reductions in board size, many corporations added a new 
corporate governance organ discussed above, the executive officer.  As Milhaupt (2001) 
noted, executive officers went from being a Sony innovation in 1997 to a fixture at over 
200 firms by 1999.  Survey data confirm that 71.4 percent of responding firms had 
adopted such a mechanism (Shoji homu kenkyukai 1999).  
Share Repurchases.  In 1998, following Commercial Code revisions, 1,179 
companies announced share buybacks, and 186 implemented them in that year 
(Yasui 1999: 26; Zhang 2000).  Buybacks by listed companies in fiscal 2001 
exceeded 2.3 trillion yen (about $20 billion) for more than two billion shares, an 
increase of nearly 100 percent over fiscal 2000 (Jisha kabu kai baizo 2 cho encho 
2002). 
Norm shifts.  The past decade has not only been a time of enormous formal 
institutional (legal) change in Japanese corporate governance, it has also been a time of 
informal institutional (normative) change.  Norms are simply nonlegal rules—rules that 
are neither promulgated by an official source nor enforced through formal sanctions, yet 
  16are regularly complied with (Posner 1997).  Major features of postwar Japanese corporate 
governance--the main bank system, the concomitant absence of an external market for 
corporate control, employee-dominated boards that focus on day-to-day management 
rather than monitoring, and the lifetime employment system—were all shaped and 
supported by social norms (Milhaupt 2001; Ono and Moriguchi, this volume).  That is, 
the operation of these institutions was heavily influenced by shared expectations about 
how Japanese banks, firms, and their governmental regulators should operate. 
Over the past decade, however, these expectations have been severely tested, if 
not shattered.  It is apparent that significant norm shifts are under way in Japan: increased, 
if grudging, acceptance of the takeover as a legitimate tool of corporate strategy and 
monitoring, a heightened awareness of shareholders’ economic expectations, a change in 
managerial mindset about its proper role in running the firm, diminished expectations of 
forbearance toward failing firms on the part of banks and their regulators, and rising 
ambivalence about the benefits of seniority-based employment practices (Milhaupt 2001).  
In this sense, along with the corporate law, the “informal” institutional environment for 
Japanese corporate governance has changed in a manner almost unthinkable a decade ago. 
Much of this environmental change, in turn, has taken place because of changes in 
formal institutions discussed above that have reduced the transaction costs of basic 
corporate activities such as engaging in mergers and acquisitions, filing a derivative suit, 
or conducting a corporate reorganization.  As actors engage in these newly feasible 
activities, they undermine the continued validity of “cultural” explanations for Japanese 
corporate practices, and help create new expectations about how the world works.   
  17B.  What Hasn’t Changed 
Despite these considerable signs of new activity, a balanced assessment of the 
past decade must also highlight stasis in important areas of Japanese corporate 
governance.  Despite the more flexible and shareholder-oriented formal framework 
provided by the corporate law, the managerialist and employee-oriented cast to the 
Japanese firm has not been fundamentally eroded.  Despite predictions to the contrary 
(see Hansmann and Kraakman 2001), it is not evident that we are witnessing the “end of 
history for corporate law” brought on by a Japanese embrace of the U.S. shareholder-
oriented model.  In fact, a “market test” of the degree of convergence between Japanese 
and U.S. corporate governance is now possible, at least with respect to board structure.  
As noted above, as of April 2003, firms have the option of adopting a U.S.-style 
committee system with outside directors in lieu of the Japanese-style board of statutory 
auditors.  Thus far, a relatively small number of Japanese firms have adopt the U.S. board 
structure featuring committees of independent directors, principally because few Japanese 
chief executives are willing to cede authority over important functions such as board 
nominations to outside directors.
18  
There are other examples of non-change in important areas.  Japanese institutional 
investors, for example, remain passive.  Most such investors still place priority on 
maintaining reciprocal business relationships over increasing shareholder value.  They 
vote, but rarely coordinate with other institutional investors on corporate governance 
                                                 
18  A survey conducted in mid-2002, about ten months prior to the availability of the “committee option,” 
indicated that just 13 (0.5%) of the 2513 responding firms would switch to the committee-based structure 
(JCAA 2002).  As of this writing, the major exception to the general lack of interest in the committee 
option is the electronics industry.  Major firms in that industry such as Sony and Hitachi have adopted the 
committee structure.  The precise reasons are unclear, but appear to include a desire to signal that the firm 
has “modern” and internationally accepted corporate governance mechanisms, and a “follow-the-leader” 
effect, as Sony was the first to adopt this structure.  
  18issues, make shareholder proposals, release focus lists, or engage in other efforts to 
improve performance at portfolio firms (Akaishi 2002).  To be fair, institutional investors 
in most countries are passive, and the corporate governance record of institutional 
investors in the United States is mixed.  But even with these caveats, Japanese 
institutional investors to date seem remarkably hesitant to press management for 
improved performance, or to consider selling their shares in the face of a financially 
attractive offer.    
Indeed, the initial forays into shareholder activism discussed in the previous 
section have sent a decidedly mixed message on the state of Japanese corporate 
governance.  While the mere existence (however scant) of hostile takeovers and proxy 
fights is a sign of change, both of the recent, purely domestic bids failed. And they failed 
in large part because banks and institutional investors gave unconditional support to 
existing management when the unwelcome bidder appeared (see e.g., Institutions 
Threaten Corporate Governance 2002). 
As these episodes suggest, Japanese management is still largely insulated from 
market pressures, disabling a major force for new governance adaptations.  This 
impression is bolstered by the lack of market activity around firms that should be ripe for 
takeover.  Figure 2 illustrates the ratio of bust-up value to market capitalization for 779 
non-financial Tokyo Stock Exchange firms.  As the figure indicates, as of 2000 
approximately 13 percent of these firms were trading below their bust-up value.
19   In 
other words, more than one of every eight public firms in Japan in that year was worth 
more in liquidation than under current management.   This situation per se is not 
                                                 
19 Source: Nomura Research Institute (2001).  Bust-up value is defined as cash and cash equivalents + 
investment securities - short and long-term debt. Calculated for 779 non-financial Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Firms as of November 2000. 
  19unprecedented.  Some U.S. firms traded below their bust-up values in the 1980s.  In 
contrast to the U.S. situation, however, there is virtually no market action in Japan to 
dismantle these firms.  Despite the obvious potential to profit by acquiring and then 
selling off the assets of these firms, bids are rare.  Milhaupt and West (2003) argue that 
this situation is the result of transaction costs that outweight profits from takeovers, due 
to poor disclosure practices, mandatory bid procedures that may increase the uncertainty 
of successfully obtaining a controlling stake in the target, and other obstacles. 
 















Another important area of relative stasis is employment practices.  Evidence to 
date indicates that lifetime employment remains a core feature of the Japanese firm, even 
if the number of workers enjoying its protections is shrinking.  A 1999 survey indicates 
that a majority of companies plan to maintain the lifetime employment system; most are 
seeking to reduce employment through natural or incentivized attrition (Hisada et al. 
1999).  A comprehensive study of survey results and qualitative data finds little support 
for the rhetorical claim that lifetime employment practices are coming to an end (Kato 
  202001).  As one recent study concluded, “[t]hus far, there has been no evidence that firms 
have changed their long-term employment system in the manufacturing sector except for 
a few firms that have faced financial distress” (Miyajima and Aoki 2002). 
In sum, with some important variations at the margins, Japanese management 
appears to be operating within the same basic set of incentives as ten years ago. 
 
III.  Explaining the Pattern of Change and Non-Change 
 
Our survey of the past decade of corporate law and governance in Japan raises 
two major questions.  Why has there been so much corporate law reform?  And why have 
actual changes in corporate governance practices to date been far less sweeping than the 
changes in formal institutions?  
A.  Why So Much Legal Reform? 
The accelerated pace and expanded scope of corporate legal reform over the past 
decade reflect changes both in the macro economy and the political economy of Japan 
(see Kanda 2000).  First, the Commercial Code has traditionally contained “surprisingly 
paternalistic, archaic and impractical concepts” (Osugi and Zaloom 2002: 2), particularly 
in relation to corporate finance and organizational structures.  To cite just a few examples, 
until recently, repurchase of a company’s own stock was prohibited except in narrowly 
defined circumstances, severe limitations were placed on the kind of equity stock that a 
company could issue, and holding companies were banned.  While these rules were 
designed to protect creditors and shareholders, some scholars have termed the restrictions 
“senseless” (see Ramseyer and Nakazato 1999; Osugi and Zaloom 2002).  Senseless or 
not, these restrictions had little impact on Japanese economic activity in the high growth 
period.  Because bank lending was the dominant mode of corporate finance for much of 
  21the post-war high growth period, the Code’s strict restrictions on equity finance 
techniques and emphasis on technical creditor and shareholder protections posed little 
obstacle to firms.  Indeed, a relatively mechanical, rule-oriented approach to corporate 
law may have complemented Japan’s small judiciary and accounting profession (Kanda 
and Fujita 1998; Osugi and Zaloom 2002).
20    However, as the economy stalled and 
many corporate sectors were in need of massive restructuring, these serious constraints 
on organizational form and corporate finance began to block needed reforms. 
Second, as corporate managers became increasingly conscious of the 
organizational straightjacket imposed by the Commercial Code, particularly in 
comparison to U.S. firms, the political economy of Commercial Code reform changed 
significantly.  Put differently, the market for the production of corporate law became 
much more competitive.  Through the mid-1990s, Commercial Code amendments were 
the province of a small group of legal scholars and Ministry of Justice officials, who 
convened a Legislative Reform Council to study—often for years—the propriety of 
potential amendments.  Under this process, the law changed, but relatively slowly and 
seldom in response to the exigencies of the market (although quite often in response to 
scandals (West 2001b)).  In the words of one scholar, much corporate law reform over 
the past century was “policy pushed,” rather than “demand pulled.” (Shishido 1999).  But 
law reform process changed dramatically in the latter half the 1990s.  Stock options are 
the first illustration of the change.  The success of Silicon Valley’s venture capital 
                                                 
20   By contrast, flexible and permissive corporate laws empowering boards to engage in any lawful 
activity, subject only to the constraints of fiduciary standards applied ex post by courts to police selfish or 
grossly inattentive managerial behavior—characteristics of U.S. corporate law (see, e.g., Chandler and 
Strine 2003)--complement a fairly robust financial disclosure regime and an expansive legal system, 
featuring a large legal profession, a judiciary comfortable with the application of broad standards as 
opposed to narrow rules, and a procedural environment replete with procedural mechanisms to promote 
private litigation as a tool of enforcement. 
  22industry drew envious glances from the Japanese, whose own VC market was inhibited 
by a variety of legal rigidities (Milhaupt 1997).  For example, various Commercial Code 
restrictions made the issuance of stock options virtually impossible.  This prompted an 
unprecedented reform of the Commercial Code in 1997, which liberalized the stock 
option regime.  For the first time in postwar history, an amendment was initiated by 
politicians rather than bureaucrats working through the Legislative Reform Council, as 
the business community prevailed upon Diet members to bypass the traditional, 
ponderous amendment process (Kanda 2000).  Since 1997, the business community, 
working through their political allies in the Liberal Democratic Party, has had a much 
larger voice in the corporate law reform process.
21  Other recent examples of direct 
business and political input in the production of corporate law include the 2001 
amendment permitting firms to limit the personal liability of directors for breach of duty, 
and withdrawal of a Ministry of Justice draft amendment requiring the appointment of at 
least one outside director to the board of large corporations. 
In addition to politicians and business groups, the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI, the predecessor of Ministry of International Trade and Industry or 
MITI) has also become actively involved in corporate governance reform.  Over the past 
several years, it has promoted a number of special statutes on corporate issues (Kanda 
2000).  These special statutes, which will likely be incorporated into the Commercial 
Code in the future, seek to create a more favorable environment for business startups and 
large-scale corporate restructurings.  More broadly, METI now actively monitors and 
publicly intervenes in corporate governance issues, supporting the creation of a market-
                                                 
21  For example, Seiichi Ota, the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Subcommittee on 
Commercial Law, leaves no doubt that his subcommittee placed priority on ensuring that the business 
community’s views were reflected in recent Commercial Code amendments (see Ota 2002). 
  23oriented, flexible institutional framework for business activity.  This is a remarkable role 
reversal for a ministry that, in the high growth era, often served to enforce—informally, 
through administrative guidance—anti-competitive agreements worked out in 
consultation with industry.  There may be many reasons why the ministry changed stripes.  
Discussions with officials suggest concern about the international competitiveness of 
Japanese firms and frustration over the failure of monetary and fiscal policy to restore the 
country’s economic health.  In this environment, the creation of a sound institutional 
framework for corporate restructuring and good governance practices is seen by METI 
officials as a logical focus of the ministry’s efforts.         
Thus, in effect, the Legislative Reform Council now has active competitors in the 
corporate law reform process: politicians working closely with business interests, and 
METI.  The result of this competitive pressure is more “demand driven” corporate law 
amendments, made at an accelerated pace.  “Demand driven” law can reflect the 
parochial interests of organized groups, or it can be responsive to broader public interests.  
As we will see in the next section, the decade’s corporate law amendments reflect both 
characteristics. 
B.  Why Not More Behavioral Change? 
  Despite a sea change in Japanese corporate law and the process by which it is 
produced, to date there has been no sea change in Japanese corporate governance.  Why?  
Two fairly prosaic reasons can be mentioned: legal change often outpaces behavioral 
change, and some important Japanese actors remain unconvinced of the need for 
corporate governance reform despite a decade of economic turmoil.  The latter point 
might be termed the “Toyota Effect,” because that firm, simultaneously one of Japan’s 
  24most successful and traditional, is the example universally proffered by those who defend 
the status quo in Japanese corporate governance.  Without discounting the importance of 
those factors, I wish to concentrate here on three deeper explanations for the lack of 
change, one based on institutional complementarities, the second drawn from learning on 
political economy, and the third related to the limits of corporate law as a vehicle for 
reform.  
It is now commonplace to understand corporate governance systems as a series of 
complementary institutions.  As Gilson (2001a: 335) puts it, a “corporate governance 
system’s development is driven, domino-like, by the linking of complementary 
institutions.”  Milgrom and Roberts (1994) were among the first to view the major 
components of Japanese corporate governance in its heyday—the main bank system, 
lifetime employment, stable shareholding patterns, and relatively weak capital markets, 
as institutional complementarities.  When complementarities are at work, the separate 
pieces that make up the entire system display increasing returns characteristics; their 
inclusion enhances the effectiveness of the other parts of the system, so that the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts.  But complementarities have a dark side in times of 
institutional change: piecemeal reform of complementary systems is problematic, because 
the same dynamic that increases returns when the system is functioning as a whole works 
to exaggerate the downside when one element of the system breaks down or is replaced.  
The result may be a whole that is less than the sum of its parts.   
It is useful to view the developments in Japanese corporate governance over the 
past decade in light of these insights.  Although many formal rules and structures have 
changed, important complementary institutions necessary to complete the new system are 
  25still missing.  Many examples could be offered to illustrate this point, but I will focus on 
three.  First, while shareholders’ legal rights have been strengthened by lowering filing 
fees and reducing minimum shareholding thresholds for their exercise, complementary 
facets of the legal and financial disclosure systems that would complement these rights 
are still not fully in place.  The population of Japanese lawyers and judges remains 
extremely small by international standards.  Access to evidence as a plaintiff can be 
problematic, as Japan lacks a formal discovery system for the production of evidence.  
The courts are still relatively disinclined to apply broad standards and create flexible 
remedies to resolve cases.  And while Japanese accounting standards are now consistent 
with international standards, accounting practices lag behind. 
  A second example can be found in the new Civil Rehabilitation Statute.  This new 
regime appears to be quite efficient (in terms of the length of time from filing to 
resolution) both in relation to the predecessor statute and in comparison to U.S. corporate 
reorganization procedures (see Xu 2002).  A more efficient bankruptcy regime in Japan is 
an important component of an institutional structure that promotes the efficient allocation 
of resources.  Yet the impact of this new bankruptcy regime on resource allocation will 
be muted if many functionally insolvent firms continue to operate under soft budget 
constraints because their lenders continue to exercise forbearance (see, e.g. Regional 
Banks Should be Spared from Bad Loan Target 2003).  Thus, political and social will to 
end bank support to insolvent firms is a necessary (and thus far largely missing) 
complement to good bankruptcy laws.   
A third example is board reform.  The trend toward smaller boards having some 
representation by outside directors, and a separation of functions between directors and 
  26executive officers, is intuitively more conducive to strategic decision-making and 
effective monitoring.
22  Yet, as shown in the data on takeovers in the previous section, 
there is still little threat that value destroying decisions by Japanese management will 
lead to their replacement by a hostile acquirer or at the behest of a large, disgruntled 
shareholder.  The missing market for corporate control would complement the trend 
toward smaller, more strategically focused boards. 
  A second explanation for the muted nature of corporate governance change to 
date is provided by theory on the operation of political markets and the legislative process.  
Mancur Olson (1982) predicts a rent-seeking political response to economic distress by 
threatened interest groups.  Consistent with this model, Japanese business groups 
(representing the interests of corporate managers) have significantly increased their voice 
in the corporate law production process.  The impact of this input is readily apparent from 
a review of the decade’s amendments.  As noted above, the amendments of the past ten 
years can be viewed as either flexibility enhancing or monitoring enhancing.  We can 
assume that management would favor the former type of amendment, since greater 
flexibility enhances managerial discretion and at least potentially increases agency slack 
between managers and shareholders.  Several flexibility enhancing amendments are 
indisputably management favoring—for example, the 2001 amendment authorizing 
limitation of personal liability of managers, and authorizing share acquisition rights, 
which will be useful in constructing defenses to hostile takeovers.
23  While some 
                                                 
22 Most empirical studies to date have not established that independent directors contribute to firm 
performance (see e.g., Bhagat and Black 2002).   
23  Commercial Code, Arts. 266(7) through 266(19) (limitation of directors’ liability); Arts. 280-19 
through 280-39 (stock acquisition rights).  Under the amendment, stock acquisition rights can be issued to 
anyone without shareholder approval, at an exercise price to be determined by the board.  This makes 
technically feasible a defensive tactic widely used in the United States known at the poison pill.  The 
  27amendments have enhanced the ability of shareholders to monitor management, they 
were enacted prior to heavy business involvement in the corporate law amendment 
process.  More recent amendments that are ostensibly monitoring enhancing, namely 
reforms to the statutory auditor system, may have actually served as a means of staving 
off more drastic corporate governance reforms such as mandating the use of outside 
directors (Osugi and Zaloom 2002).  At least under the existing equilibrium, with 
relatively weak pressure from the capital markets and institutional investors, many of the 
rule changes over the past decade have the effect of expanding the scope of managerial 
discretion without ensuring that such discretion is utilized to enhance shareholder value.   
The upshot is that until the environment external to the formal corporate 
governance structure changes, shareholders may or may not benefit from the new legal 
regime, depending on whether management of a given firm utilizes the newfound 
flexibility provided by the corporate law to pursue enhanced shareholder value, or to 
further insulate itself from market discipline. 
This point leads to a third explanation for the relative lack of change despite 
massive corporate law reform: corporate law bears only a limited relationship to 
corporate governance.  The point is best made by turning to the experience of the United 
States in the 1980s.  American corporate governance underwent enormous functional 
changes in the 1980s, but these changes were not driven by changes in the formal 
structure of the governance system.  Indeed, the corporate statutes changed very little at 
this time—although critically, “the existing formal structure proved sufficiently mutable 
to accommodate the necessary changes” (Gilson 2001b: 9).  Rather, the existing legal 
                                                                                                                                                 
poison pill is a plan whereby existing shareholders obtain the right to purchase additional shares of the 
company (typically for a nominal sum) upon the occurrence of a triggering event, such as a takeover 
attempt. 
  28system became “supercharged” by changes in product markets, capital markets, and the 
distribution of shareholders (Ibid).  These changes to the corporate governance system 
created forces for change so powerful that those favoring existing institutions, 
particularly senior management, could not contain them.  The result was a dramatic 
transformation in American corporate governance, from a system that served largely to 
protect value destroying decisions by insular groups of senior executives to a model 
whose attributes “animated international reform proposals” (Ibid. 2001: 8), at least until 
the Enron and other corporate debacles of 2001-02 exposed the U.S. system to intense 
criticism. 
Now return to the Japanese experience of the 1990s and early 2000s.  As a result 
of the past decade’s amendments, Japan now has a corporate code that permits mutability 
and is consistent with active shareholder monitoring.  But as the experience of the United 
States in the 1980s demonstrates, the corporate law can facilitate, but not initiate, change 
in corporate governance.  Substantive change is brought about by dynamics external to 
formal corporate governance institutions.  The sea change in Japanese corporate 
governance practices will occur when Japan experiences transformations analogous to 
those occurring in the United States in the 1980s—transformations that force 
management to abandon their attachment to existing institutions.  A partial catalogue of 
heretofore incomplete changes in underlying institutions, practices and mindsets includes 
the following: a new distribution of shareholders, brought about through increased 
foreign direct investment and further reductions in cross shareholding; a new approach to 
the capital markets by both firms and regulators, such as (on the private side) increased 
investment of retirement funds in equities and greater use of hostile acquisitions as a 
  29device of managerial replacement, and (on the public side) abandonment of governmental 
attempts to manage stock prices for the “benefit” of banks, which still hold large 
portfolios of under-performing shares; new incentive structures for senior management, 
who, short of financial crisis, currently have little incentive to do anything but await 
comfortable retirements; and further erosion of existing corporate norms that stigmatize 
redeployment of corporate assets to higher value uses as signaling “failure” or involving 
“the sale of people.”   
It is often said that Japan should retain beneficial aspects of its corporate 
governance system rather than rushing to emulate U.S. practices.  Fair enough, but no 
commentators dare to be specific about which practices should be retained and which 
should be changed.  Japanese managers will discover the answer only when they are 
forced to adapt.  The corporate law now permits, but does not require, them to do so.  
Only the surrounding institutions, which contribute importantly to the incentive structures 




It has not been a lost decade for corporate governance reform in Japan.  As a 
result of massive legal change, a formal institutional framework conducive to good 
corporate governance is now in place.  Early signs suggest that academic and other 
observers are wrong to harbor grave doubts about the effectiveness of legal reforms in 
altering Japanese corporate behavior (Columbia Conference 2001; Root 2001).  The 
experience of the past decade indicates that Japanese corporate actors do respond to legal 
reform, particularly reforms that lower the transaction costs of exercising shareholders’ 
rights and doing deals.   
  30But legal change alone is insufficient to transform corporate governance practices.  
That transformation will require an even more complex set of changes in incentive 
structures and attitudes prevailing throughout the economic system.  This larger set of 
changes is under way, but far from complete.   
To return to the metaphor from the new institutional economics, although the 
game has new rules, play will truly change only when new players enter in large numbers, 
or existing players are encouraged (or forced) to abandon the rules to which they have 
become accustomed, and under which they continue to prosper personally.  Or perhaps as 
other complementary institutions change outside the corporate environment, the players 
will find incentives to adjust to the new rule structure.
24  Corporate law and governance is, 
for this reason, a highly salient subject for a study of institutional change and non-change 
in Japan. 
                                                 
24   To take just one example, institutional investors may become more aggressive in seeking financial 
returns from portfolio firms as Japan’s aging population places increasing demands on the pension system. 
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